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CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS-CHILD SELLINGMARYLAND'S STATUTE PROHIBITING THE SALE,
BARTER, OR TRADE OF A CHILD IS NOT LIMITED TO
PROSCRIBING FOR-PROFIT ADOPTIONS, BUT ALSO
COVERS THE TRANSFER OF THE CUSTODY OF A CHILD
IN EXCHANGE FOR MONEY. State v. Runkles, 326 Md.
384, 605 A.2d 111 (1992).

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the words of Richard A. Posner, the preeminent authority
on legal economic theory, "the question of public policy is not
whether baby selling should be forbidden or allowed but how extensively it should be regulated." I In 1989 the General Assembly revealed
its disapproval of Posner's approach when it enacted Maryland's
first "child selling" statute. 2 The statute, codified as article 27, section
35C of the Annotated Code of Maryland, provides that a "person
may not sell, barter, or trade, or offer to sell, barter, or trade a
child for money or property, either real or personal, or anything else
of value."3
One who violates section 35C is guilty of a misdemeanor. 4 The
penalty upon conviction is a fine not exceeding $10,000, imprisonment
not exceeding five years, or both.5 In State v. Runkles,6 the Court
I. Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L.
REV. 59, 72 (1987).
2. Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 300, 1989 Md. Laws 2498 (current version at MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35E (Supp. 1994». The statute was originally designated
as § 35B but was immediately redesignated as § 35C when it was discovered
that § 35B was assigned to be under the subheading "Child Abuse." MD ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 35C (1992) (Editor's Note). The statute was again redesignated
and is presently codified at § 35E. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35E (Supp.
1994). However, this Casenote will refer to Maryland's child selling statute as
"§ 35C," because both appellate courts in Runkles v. State interpreted the
statute when it was so designated. 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992).
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C(a) (1992) (currently codified at § 35E).
4. [d. § 35C(b) (currently codified at § 35E).
5. [d. § 35C (currently codified at § 35E). Other states have similar statutes in
effect. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 181 (West 1988) (providing up to four
years imprisonment for the purchase of children); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
4305 (1983) (making it a misdemeanor of the first degree to trade, barter, buy,
sell, or deal in infant children); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08 (West 1994);
W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16 (Supp. 1994) (amended to provide that the purchase
or sale of a child is a felony).
6. 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992).
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of Appeals of Maryland construed the scope of the statute for the
first time. 7
Three months after section 35C's enactment, Allen Filmore
Runkles was charged by the State of Maryland with violating the
statute. 8 The facts leading up to this charge were stipulated in an
agreed statement of facts.9
The child sold in this case, Jason Seymour, lived with his natural
mother, JoAnn Bauerlien, his three year old brother, D.J., and Allen
Runkles, the live-in boyfriend of the child's mother. 1O JoAnn Bauerlien was the child's legal guardian. 11 Warren Seymour, the child's
paternal grandfather, had attempted unsuccessfully to obtain custody
of the childY
On August 16, 1989, Runkles contacted Seymour 13 and told him
that for $4,000, he would persuade JoAnn Bauerlien to sign over
custody of the child. 14 Seymour's attorney prepared a "Consent to
Custody Order" for the transfer of the custody of the child,l5 Two
days later, JoAnn Bauerlien, persuaded by Runkles, signed the custody order when Seymour came over for his regular visit. 16
The two men then left the house and exchanged the executed
order for $4,000. 17 Unbeknownst to Runkles, a covert police surveil-

7. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Runkles v. State, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992)
(No. 95); see Runkles, 326 Md. at 390, 605 A.2d at 114 ('''[I]t is a new statute
and there's absolutely no law."'). To date, Stambaugh v. Child Support
Enforcement Administration, 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991), and [n re
Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d 468 (1991), are the two other court
of appeals' cases discussing § 35C. However, they do not define its breadth.
8. Runkles, 326 Md. at 388-89, 605 A.2d at 113-14. The first count of the two
count criminal information filed in the Circuit Court for Carroll County
charging Runkles with committing extortion in violation of article 27, § 562B
of the Annotated Code of Maryland was nol prossed. [d. at 389 nA, 605 A.2d
at 114 nA.
9. Runkles agreed to a statement of facts pursuant to plea negotiations with the
State. Joint R. Extract at 7, Runkles v. State, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III
(1992) (No. 95). The full body of the agreed statement of facts can be found
at Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App. 492, 494-95, 590 A.2d 552, 553-54 (1991)
rev'd, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992).
10. Runkles, 326 Md. at 389, 605 A.2d at 114.
II. [d.
12. [d.

13. At trial, Runkles had indicated that it was Seymour who had contacted him
and not vice versa. The trial judge, the assistant state's attorney, and Runkles's
attorney all agreed that "who approached who" was not relevant. Joint R.
Extract at 11-12, Runkles v. State, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992) (No.
95).
14. Runkles, 326 Md. at 389, 605 A.2d at 114.
15. [d. at 390, 605 A.2d at 114.
16. [d.
17. [d.
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lance was in place outside his residence. 18 Consequently, the police
observed the exchange of both the custody papers and the money
between Runkles and Seymour, and thereafter arrested Runkles. 19
JoAnn Bauerlien admitted that Runkles persuaded her to sign over
the custody of her son,20 but denied having knowledge of Runkles
receiving money from Seymour.2'
"After hearing the [agreed] statement of facts, the trial judge
denied Runkles' motion for a judgment of acquittal."22 Recognizing,
however, that section 35C was a new statute with absolutely no law,23
the judge requested counsel to submit memoranda and held the
decision sub curia. 24 Upon considering the submitted memoranda,
the judge issued a "Memorandum Opinion" finding Runkles guilty
of violating the "child selling" statute. 25
Arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, Runkles appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 26
In a two to one decision, the court of special appeals agreed with
Runkles and reversed the circuit court's decision.27
The State petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a
writ of certiorari,28 asserting that "[t]he Court of Special Appeals
erred in construing Maryland's child selling statute as limited to
proscribing for-profit adoptions, rather than any for-profit exchange
of child custody, and in concluding that Runkles's conduct did not
violate the law. "29 The court of appeals granted certiorari,30 identified
Runkles's conduct as violative of section 35C,31 and reversed the
intermediate appellate court's decisionY
1994]

18. Id. Seymour had notified the police after Runkles contacted him in August,
1989 with his proposition. Id.
19. Id.
20. The mother had told the police "she was 'having trouble with [the child]having difficulties with [the child]' ... that 'she just couldn't take it anymore
and that the child would be better off' with the grandfather." Id.
2!. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. On May 16, 1990, Runkles was sentenced to five years imprisonment, of
which four years and three months were suspended in favor of five years
probation. Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App. 492, 494, 590 A.2d 552, 553 (1991),
rev'd, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d 111 (1992).
26. Runkles, 326 Md. at 391, 605 A.2d at 114.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 391, 605 A.2d at 115.
29. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Runkles v. State, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992)
(No. 95).
30. Runkles, 326 Md. at 392, 605 A.2d at 115.
3!. Id. at 405, 605 A.2d at 122.
32. Id. at 406, 605 A.2d at 122.
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THE INSTANT CASE

Both appellate level courts relied upon established common-law
rules of statutory construction in arriving at their opposing results.
Although for every rule of statutory interpretation there usually exists
an exception,33 basic principles consistently reappear. As noted previously by the court of appeals, "the beginning point of statutory
construction is the language of the statute itself. "34 Under the guise
of the plain-meaning rule, if the language in question is clearly
consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, and not the product
of any "absurd result," further investigation is deemed unnecessary.3S
If the statute is susceptible to more than one meaning, however,
"the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate legislative intent. "36 The legislative intent is "gleaned first
from the phrasing of the statute itself, "37 although legislative history
is almost always relied upon. 38
Recognizing the language of section 35C as "terse[,] ... concise
... and ... not defiled by tergiversation, "39 the court of appeals
also recognized that "the reach of Art. 27, § 35C [was] questioned."4O
The court noted that section 35C's facial ambiguity made it necessary
to inquire into the General Assembly's intent underlying the enactment of the statute. 41 The court emphasized its quest to "seek out
the legislative purpose, the general aim or policy, the ends to be

33. In fact, the court of appeals has specifically said, "it seems that every canon
of statutory construction has an equal and opposite canon." Kaczorowski v.
City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512, 525 A.2d 628, 631 (1987).
34. Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 603, 573 A.2d 1346, 1349
(1990).
35. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 633.
36. State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990).
37. Id. The words of the statute are given their "ordinary and popularly understood
meaning, absent a manifest contrary legislative intention." Id. (quoting In re
Arnold, 298 Md. 515, 520, 471 A.2d 313, 315 (1984».
38. See Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 516, 525 A.2d at 633. The legislative history is
relied upon so the purpose, aim, or policy of the legislature will not be
disregarded in the interpretative process. Bricker, 321 Md. at 92, 581 A.2d at
12. As the two appellate decisions involved in this case clearly reveal, however,
the canons of statutory interpretation do not ensure consistent results. Perhaps
the reason is that the courts often construe or misconstrue the language of the
rules giving rise to the method of statutory interpretation itself.
39. Runkles, 326 Md. at 392, 605 A.2d at 115. Tergiversation is defined as an
evasion of straight forward action or clear cut statement of position: equivocation, ambiguity. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (G. &
C. Merriam Co. 1976).
40. Runkles, 326 Md. at 392, 605 A.2d at 115.
41. Id. Moreover, the court noted that it is "guided by certain rules in bringing
the ghost of legislative intent to bay." Id.
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accomplished [and] the evils to be redressed by [the]
enactment
[of section 35C]."42
In assessing the legislative intent, the court of appeals examined
the legislative file of Senate Bill 58 (SB 58),43 which was later codified
as section 35C.44 In focusing on the substance of the legislative file,
the court discovered, among other things, that the intent of the
legislature with regard to the bill when initially conceived, "had been
transformed into an entirely different intent by the time the bill was
deli vered.' '45
The original objective of SB 58 was to increase the permissible
penalty for violating section 5-327 of the Family Law Article. 46 This
statute prohibits compensation in an adoption or adoption agreement,
and authorizes upon conviction a fine not exceeding $100, imprisonment not exceeding three months, or both.47
The actions of a Pennsylvania couple, who in 1988 clearly
violated the adoption compensation statute,48 prompted the move to

42. [d. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in Runkles v. State, however,
stated that they need not go beyond the statutory language itself to ascertain
the legislative intent behind the statute. Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App. 492,
496-98, 590 A.2d 552, 554-55 (1991), rev'd, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992).
Although the court of special appeals decided, by merely looking at the statute
on its face, that the General Assembly did not intend for § 35C to extend to
the facts of the instant case, the court still examined the legislative scheme and
concluded that the concerns of the General Assembly, in enacting the statute,
did not support applying § 35C to the type of transaction involved in this
case. Runkles, 87 Md. App. at 498-501, 590 A.2d at 555-56.
43. ·S. 58, 1989 Sess. (1989) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35E
(Supp. 1994».
44. Runkles, 326 Md. at 393, 605 A.2d at 115.
45. [d. at 398, 605 A.2d at 118.
46. [d. Section 5-327 provides:
(a) (I) Except as otherwise provided, an agency, institution, or individual who renders any service in connection with the placement of
an individual for adoption, or in connection with an agreement for
the custody of an individual in contemplation of adoption, may not
charge or receive from or on behalf of either the natural parent of
the individual to be adopted, or from or on behalf of the individual
who is adopting the individual, any compensation for the placement
or agreement.
(2) This subsection does not prohibit the payment, by any interested
person, of reasonable and customary charges or fees for hospital or
medical or legal services.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a) (Supp. 1994).
47. [d. § 5-327(e).
48. Runkles, 326 Md. at 398, 605 A.2d at 118. The Pennsylvania couple ran an
advertisement in a local Baltimore newspaper, the Baltimore Jewish Times,
offering to place their child up for adoption upon payment of compensation.
Legislative file to S. 58, 1989 Sess. (1989) at 22, 27. The Maryland State Police,
working in conjunction with Pennsylvania authorities, agreed to buy the baby
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increase the penalty provision of section 5-327. The Deputy State's
Attorney for Baltimore County, who initiated SB 58, was disturbed
by the fact that had the prosecution been in Maryland, the maximum
penalty that could have been imposed was a fine of $100, three
months in jail, or both.49 He wrote to Senator Paula Hollinger, SB
58's original sponsor, asking her to sponsor a bill that would increase
the penalty permitted by section 5-327 to a fine not exceeding $10,000,
imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both.50
Soon after the bill's creation,' another incident caused more
public outrage. In November 1988, an Anne Arundel County couple
sold their two month old son for $3,500 in cash and more than three
ounces of uncut cocaine. 51 The couple was prosecuted under section
5-327 of the Family Law Article, in the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel CountyY The trial judge dismissed the case, however,
holding that "[u]nder the law cited by prosecutors, [section 5-327 of
the Family Law Code], ... it would not be illegal for parents to
sell their children. "53 The judge ruled that the sale was not within
the scope of the statute. 54

49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

for $30,000. Since the exchange was made in Pennsylvania, the couple was
charged under that state's applicable law, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4305
(1983), which authorizes a much harsher penalty than § 5·327 of Maryland's
Family Law Code. Runkles, 326 Md. at 387, 398, 605 A.2d at 113, 118; Neff
Hudson, Outrage Grows Over Penalties jar Baby Sales, THE CAPITAL, Dec. 3,
1988, at AI; Legislative file to S. 58, 1989 Sess. (1989) at 12.
Pennsylvania's statute, similar to § 35C, provides that "[a) person is guilty
of a misdemeanor of the first degree if he deals in humanity, by trading,
bartering, buying, selling, or dealing in Infant children." 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 4305 (1983).
See Runkles, 326 Md. at 398, 605 A.2d at 118.
[d. at 393, 605 A.2d at 115-16.
Hudson, supra note 48; Runkles, 326 Md. at 386, 605 A.2d at 112. "The sale
was a sting set up by the police, who apparently were alerted by a rumor that
the couple had previously sold another of their children for $5,000." Runkles,
326 Md. at 387 n.2, 605 A.2d at 113 n.2.
It seems, from the introductory discussion in State v. Runkles, that the
court of appeals inadvertently merged the two separate incidents, i.e., the sales
by the Pennsylvania couple and the Anne Arundel County couple, into one
incident. The legislative file to SB 58, as reprinted in the opinion, clearly details
the distinct facts of each occurrence of baby selling. See id. at 394, 605 A.2d
at 116.
Runkles, 326 Md. at 387, 605 A.2d at 113.
Donna Weaver, Judge Dismisses Baby-Selling Charge Against Woman, Mar.
21, 1989, at I (newspaper article available in Legislative File to S. 58, 1989
Sess. (1989) at 11).
Runkles, 326 Md. at 387, 605 A.2d at 113. Circuit Court Judge Bruce C.
Williams explained that the dismissal was appropriate because '''[§ 5-327) is
directed at someone getting a fee on behalf of the parent. ... It seems to me
that the law deals with a third party who is in between the two primary
parties.'" Weaver, supra note 53, at 1.
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As a result, the sponsors soon realized that a mere increase in
the penalties permitted in section 5-327 would not accomplish what
was really desired and needed-a total prohibition against "baby
selling."55 It was then that "SB 58 was amended and the amendments
were draconian." 56
The court of appeals focused on the revamping of SB 58, finding
it patently clear that section 35C could not be limited solely to
proscribing for-profit adoptions. 57 More particularly, the amended
bill was removed from the Family Law Article, section 5-327,58 and
placed into the Crimes and Punishments Article. 59 The evolution of
SB 58 "not only resulted in [an] entirely new provision[], [section
35C,] but in the creation of an entirely new crime, aptly titled 'Child
Selling." '60
Furthermore, the original language of SB 58, merely calling for
a harsher penalty, was entirely stricken in the amendment process
and instead substituted with language that expressly prohibits baby
selling. 61 The court pointed out that "the only remaining part of the
bill as originally drafted was its designation as SB 58. "62 After
appraising the essentials of the legislative file,63 the majority was
satisfied that it correctly ascertained the legislative intent, enabling it
to interpret section 35C in a reasonable, logical manner, consistent
with common sense. 64
An analysis of the legal reasoning used by each of the Maryland
appellate courts in interpreting the statute at bar explains the different
conclusions that were reached. The dictionary's definitions of the
key terms "sell," "barter," and "trade"65 led the court of special

55.
56.
57.
5S.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

.
65.

Runkles, 326 Md. at 39S, 605 A.2d at liS.
Id. at 399, 605 A.2d at liS.
Id. at 400, 605 A.2d at 119.
[d. at 399, 605 A.2d at liS.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1992) (currently codified at § 35E). See
Runkles, 326 Md. at 399, 605 A.2d at liS.
Runkles, 326 Md. at 399, 605 A.2d at liS.
Id. The majority noted ample support throughout the legislative file for this
interpretation. See id. at 399-400, 605 A.2d at IIS-19.
[d. at 400, 605 A.2d at 119.
The court relied on all relevant items in the legislative file of S8 5S. A complete
listing of the items, and the substance of each, can be found in Runkles, 326
Md. at 393-9S, 605 A.2d at liS-IS.
[d. at 401, 605 A.2d at 119. The court of appeals emphasized that when
interpreting a statute against the background of legislative history, '''results
that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be
avoided.'" [d. at 393, 605 A.2d at 115 (citations omitted).
The court of special appeals quoted the definitions of the key terms directly
from certain dictionaries.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (3d ed. unabr. 19S6) defines
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appeals to conclude that the "General Assembly ... did not intend
that the statute extend to the facts of the instant case."66 The court
of special appeals, in considering and defining the language of section
35C,67 determined that the "definition of each of these words encompasses the receipt of something in return for the goods sold, bartered
or exchanged. "68 The intermediate appellate court's decision, that
section 35C "on its face, cannot be read to proscribe the transfer of
custody for consideration, "69 derived from two basic considerations:
(1) the General Assembly's decision to define the crime of baby
selling in terms more descriptive of a commercial transaction 70 and
(2) the court's own distinction between relinquishing custody and the
sale of a child. 71
In contrast, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, after perusing
the legislative history of SB 58, resolved the conflict "of opinion
among those learned in the law as to exactly what"72 section 35C
covered. The court declared that "now there are two statutes in
effect, one intended to prohibit the sale of the adoption of a child
[section 5-327], and the other intended to prohibit generally the sale
of a child [section 35C]. "73

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

the relevant words as follows:
To sell: To give up (property) to another for money or other valuable
consideration: hand over or transfer title to (as goods or real estate)
for a price; to give up in return for something else; to exact a price
for.
To barter: To trade by exchanging one commodity for another.
To trade: To give in exchange for another commodity; to buy and
sell (as stock) regularly; to give one thing in return for another.
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) similarly defines the terms:
Sale: A contract between two parties ... by which the [seller), in
consideration of the payment ... of a certain price in money, transfers
to the [buyer] the title and the possession of property ....
To barter: To exchange goods or services without using money.
To trade: The act or the business of buying and selling for money;
traffic; barter. ...
Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App. 492, 496-98, 590 A.2d 552, 554-55 (1991),
rev'd, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992).
[d. at 498, 590 A.2d at 555.
The court of special appeals focused on definitions of the words "sell,"
"barter," and "trade" in considering the language of the statute. [d. at 49698, 590 A.2d at 554-55. See supra note 65.
Runkles, 87 Md. App. at 496, 590 A.2d at 554.
[d.
[d. The court of special appeals analogized the sale of a child to an adoption
within the statute. [d.
[d.
State v. Runkles, 326 Md. 384, 392,605 A.2d 111,115 (1992).
[d. at 400, 605 A.2d at 119 (emphasis added).
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After deciding that the General Assembly intended section 35C
to have a broad reach, and therefore that section 35C was not limited
to proscribing for-profit adoptions,74 the court of appeals found it
"patent that ordinarily a consent to the transfer of legal and physical
custody of a child for money is proscribed by the statute. "75
Upon deciding that the transfer of legal and physical custody of
a child for money was a crime in Maryland, the court found that
the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that
Runkles had committed the crime of baby selling. 76 Identifying the
crime created by section 35C as, "namely, the sale, barter or trade
of a child for anything of value,"77 the court was satisfied that the
evidence, supplied by the agreed statement of facts in the case sub
judice, supported and proved the corpus delicti. 78
The majority was further persuaded that the evidence established
Runkles's criminal agency.79 Although Runkles did not have the actual
authority to consent to the transfer of the child because he was
neither a natural parent nor the child's guardian, Runkles became a
principal in the activities that violated section 35C when he persuaded
the child's mother to consent to the relinquishment of custody of
the child. 80
74. [d. at 401, 605 A.2d at 119.

75. [d. at 402, 605 A.2d at 120. In addition to the legislative history of SB 58,
the court of appeals felt that its own definition of "custody," as devised in
Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964 (1986), required this finding:
Embraced within the meaning of "custody" are the concepts of
"legal" and "physical" custody. Legal custody carries with it the
right and obligation to make long range decisions involving education,
religious training, discipline, medical care, and other matters of major
significance concerning the child's life and welfare. Physical custody
... means the right and obligation to provide a home for the child
and to make the day-to-day decisions required during the time the
child is actually with the parent having such custody.
Runkles, 326 Md. at 402, 605 A.2d at 120 (citing Taylor, 306 Md. at 296, 508
A.2d at 967).
76. Runkles, 326 Md. at 403-06, 605 A.2d at 121-22. Noting that the Legislature
did not define what was meant by "sell, barter or trade a child," id. at 401,
605 A.2d at 120, the court specifically stated that "[t]he full sweep of the
statute must await another day; we do not now mark the precise boundaries
of the entire area which the Legislature intended to cover," id. at 402, 605
A.2d at 120.
The court additionally noted that the "mother's conduct ... was in nowise
criminal," and unequivocally dismissed any statute she arguably violated. [d.
at 403, 605 A.2d at 120-21. Because she "knew nothing about the payment of
money for her consent," the mother could not have violated § 35C due to her
lack of intent. [d. at 403, 605 A.2d at 120.
77. [d. at 404, 605 A.2d at 121.
78. [d.
79. [d.
80. [d. at 404-05, 605 A.2d at 121.
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Returning to the place where it marked its focus,81 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland concluded that "Runkles's conduct renounced
the legislative purpose of the statute; it denigrated the general aim
and policy of the Legislature; it was contrary to the ends intended
to be accomplished; it mocked the evils to be redressed. "82 Unlike
the appellate court below, the court of appeals rejected Runkles's
argument that he merely sold his influence and persuasion, rather
than a child. 83
III.

BACKGROUND

In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified, abolishing slavery and the corresponding buying
and selling of people as chattel. 84 Yet, it was not until 1989 that
Maryland enacted section 35C of the Crimes and Punishments Article
which prevents the buying and selling of children. 85
The case law interpreting section 35C is sparse, due to the
novelty of the statute. 86 Therefore, it is primarily the legislative history
of SB 58 that provided insight into the framework within which the
Court of Appeals of Maryland operated when it defined the scope
of section 35C in Runkles.
Prior to Runkles v. State,87 the court of appeals had briefly
examined section 35C in In re Adoption No. 9979. 88 No. 9979,
however, primarily focused on section 5-327 of the Family Law
Article. 89 The court determined that section 5-327 includes, within its
prohibition, payments of compensation to, or on behalf of, a natural
parent. 90 The court then specifically concluded that the payment by
adopting parents to a natural mother for the cost of maternity
clothing was prohibited by the statute. 91 In reaching its. decision in
81. See supra text accompanying note 42.
82. Runkles, 326 Md. at 405, 605 A.2d at 122. More specifically, the aim of the

83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

General Assembly and the ends of the statute were to stop baby selling on the
open market. The evil the statute sought to redress was the trafficking in
children. Id. at 401, 605 A.2d at 120.
Id. at 405-06, 605 A.2d at 122.
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United
States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I. See Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App.
492, 493, 590 A.2d 552, 552 (1991), rev'd, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992).
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992).
323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d 468 (1991).
See supra note 46 for the body of the statute. For a complete analysis of No.
9979 and § 5-327 of the Family Law Article, see Don Rea, Note, In re
Adoption No. 9979, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 133 (1993).
No. 9979, 323 Md. at 50, 591 A.2d at 473.
Id.
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No. 9979, the court of appeals lunged into a discussion of section
35C.92
The court of appeals noted that the original purpose of SB 58
was simply to increase the permissible penalty of section 5-327. 93 The
court also recognized, as it did in Runkles, that ultimately, SB 58
did not amend section 5-327 but rather "created the new criminal
offense relating to the attempted or consummated sale, barter, or
trade of a child. "94 In its review of the legislative history, the court
of appeals in No. 9979, came to the same conclusions as it did
almost one year later in Runkles. 95
The court of appeals indicated a position in No. 9979, however,
that is inconsistent with its position in Runkles. The court of appeals
in No. 9979, claimed to have no way of knowing if the circuit judge
dismissed the case against the Anne Arundel County couple because
of his belief that the sale of the baby was not tied to an adoption
placement, and therefore not within the parameters of section 5-327,
or the judge's belief that section 5-327 did not cover payments made
directly to a natural parent. 96 However, the legislative file to SB 58,
which was examined by the court of appeals in No. 9979,97 contained
a newspaper clipping that specifically explained the circuit court
judge's reasoning for the dismissa1. 98 In the clipping, the trial judge
was cited as stating that his decision was based on the latter reason,
that section 5-327 did not cover payments made directly to a natural
parent. 99 The No. 9979 court posited, however, that if the judge's
"decision rested upon a belief that the prohibition of section 5-327
does not extend to payments made directly to a natural parent . . .
it was in error." 100 This indicates that the court of appeals in No.
9979 believed that section 5-327 would have applied to the Anne
Arundel County couple. Yet in its decision in Runkles, only one year
later, the court of appeals stated that" [n]o matter what the penalty
may have been for [section 5-327], the Anne Arundel County couple,
who sold their child for money and dope, could not have been found

92. [d. at 45-48, 591 A.2d at 471-73. The court's attention was called to § 35C

93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

99.
100.

by the appellants, the adopting parents, who contested the trial judge's order
that the natural mother recompense the adopting parents for the $488 she was
given for maternity clothing. [d. at 40-41, 591 A.2d at 469.
No. 9979, 323 Md. at 47, 591 A.2d at 472. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
No. 9979, 323 Md. at 47, 591 A.2d at 472.
Compare id. at 47-48, 591 A.2d at 472-73 with supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
No. 9979, 323 Md. at 48, 591 A.2d at 472.
See id. at 47-48, 591 A.2d at 472-73.
See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
No. 9979, 323 Md. at 48, 591 A.2d at 472-73.
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guilty under [section] 5-327 under the ruling of the circuit court." 101
In light of the favorable tone the court of appeals expressed in
interpreting the legislative history of SB 58,102 this apparent contradiction of terms was part of the court's justification for reading
section 35C so broadly in Runkles.
Both In re Adoption No. 9979 103 and State v. Runkles lO4 give a
thorough chronology of the legislative history behind SB 58. The
overriding significance of the history underlying SB 58, was its
transformation from a mere proposal to increase the penalties provided by section 5-327 to the creation of an entirely new and separate
crime-that of baby selling. lOS
IV .

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

In its initial form, SB 58 was not intended to cover the activities
in which Runkles engaged. 106 The evolution of the legislative intent
supporting SB 58 is reflected through the plethora of documents
produced during the bill's three drafts.107 The statute's legislative
history reveals that the General Assembly clearly had the welfare of
children in mind, despite. its usage of words in the statute that have
been construed by some as "commercial" in nature. lOS
The Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that its interpretation
of section 35C in State v. Runkles was not an interpretation of the
full sweep of the statute. 109 Yet in identifying the exchange of custody
of a child for money as within the ambit of section 35C, the court
opened the floodgates for future litigation that will test the statute's
breadth. The arguments posited by the parties and judges involved
in the case sub judice show that such litigation will prove to be
simply a game, only to be won by the individual(s) best skilled in
the use of semantics.
The dissenters on the court of appeals in Runkles argued that
section 35C was "intended to reach the situation in which a parent,
or other person covered by the statute, sought to transfer parental
rights and responsibilities with respect to the child for money, prop101. Runkles, 326 Md. at 399, 605 A.2d at 118.
102. See No. 9979, 323 Md. at 47-48, 591 A.2d at 472-73; Runkles, 326 Md. at
398-402, 605 A.2d at 118-20.
103. 323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d 468 (1991).
104. 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992).
105. The legislative file of S8 58 is on record at the Maryland Department of
Legislative References.
106. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
108. See Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App. 492, 498, 590 A.2d 552, 555 (1991), rev'd,
326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992).
109. Runkles, 326 Md. at 402, 605 A.2d at 120.
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erty, or anything else of value." 110 Yet with this proposition, the
dissent is implicitly accepting the majority's position that total custody of the child was exchanged and, therefore, a violation of the
statute indeed occurred. II I
The decision of the majority of the court of appeals was based
largely on its broad interpretation of the legislative intent behind SB
58. 112 Judge McAuliffe opined, however, in a concurring opinion in
Runkles, that the majority's holding should have been based on the
rationale used by the dissent in the court of special appeals.1I3
Judge Moylan, the sole dissenter for the court of special appeals
in Runkles v. State,114 rejected what he described as the majority's
"major premise."lls Judge Moylan interpreted section 35C to be a
clear criminal statute on its face. He argued that if the legislature
wanted to limit the statute to activity relating solely to adoption, it
.wouid have expressly done SO.116
Judge Moylan interpreted section 35C as a complete prohibition
of any commercial trafficking in children. 1I7 He further criticized the
court of special appeals's analogy that linked the trafficking of
children to the sale of property, and argued that any such interpretation "would run afoul of the spirit and the letter of the statute as
surely as would an agreement to consent to adoption."118 Judge
Moylan also argued that the distinction made by the court of special
appeals between adoption and custody was strained and totally
inapposite.11 9
110. [d. at 408, 605 A.2d at 123 (Bell, J. and Eldridge, J., dissenting).

III. The court of appeals' majority concluded that the mother's consent to the
transfer of custody included both the legal and physical custody of the child.
[d. at 403, 605 A.2d at 120. According to the definition of "custody" that
the court of appeals adopts, see supra note 75 and accompanying text, the
dissenters would have to accept this total transfer of parental rights and
responsibilities as within the purview of the statute.
112. See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
113. Runkles, 326 Md. at 406, 605 A.2d at 122 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). See
Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App. 492, 502-08, 590 A.2d 552, 557-60 (1991),
rev'd, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992), for the text of the dissent.
114. 87 Md. App. 492, 590 A.2d 552 (1991), rev'd, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III
(1992).
115. [d. at 502, 590 A.2d at 557. The major premise being "that there is a necessary
relationship between the criminal statute [§ 35C] and the section from the
Family Law Article [§ 5-327) referred to by the majority." [d.
116. !d.
117. [d. This interpretation later proved to be the thrust of the State's argument.
See Petitioner's Brief at 7-9, Runkles v. State, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III
(1992) (No. 95). Further, this interpretation was both explicitly and implicitly
adopted by the majority of court of appeals. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 401,
605 A.2d at 119-20.
118. Runkles, 87 Md. App. at 503, 590 A.2d at 557.
119. [d. Moylan listed several types of conduct that would be encompassed in the
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Judge Moylan's approach, in determining that exchanging custody of a child for money is within the purview of section 35C, was
simple, direct, and an outright rejection of the court of special
appeals' unfounded logic. To make the "commercial distinction," as
the court of special appeals did, between adoption and custody, and
then to use that distinction as the basis for a narrow interpretation
of section 35C, not only offends principles of logic, but also of
justice. 120
The majority of the court of special appeals relied on the General
Assembly's use of "commercial terms" as the rationale underlying
their distinction between selling a child and transferring custody of
a child,l21 Although the terms "sale," "barter," or "trade" are
applicable in a commercial context, that alone should not have been
the impetus for asserting that section 35C approaches the crime of
baby selling in terms of "goods, wares, and merchandise [rather]
than one dealing with human beings of any age."122 This rationale
would cause an agreement for the "possession" of a child, and not
the "ownership" of a child, to fall outside the boundaries of the
statute. 123 Such a distinction ignores the child's welfare and focuses
instead solely on what the parents are or are not forfeiting. This
ownership versus possession distinction is clearly "unreasonable,
illogical, and inconsistent with common sense. "124
Judge Moylan, in his dissent, posited an argument that provided
obvious, if not additional, merit to the contention that Runkles's
conduct fell within the scope of section 35C. Judge Moylan pointed
to specific language in section 35C, namely the prohibition of offering
to sell, barter, or trade a child, as support for his position. 125
The court of special appeals's majority accepted Runkles's argument that his conduct, in relation to JoAnn Bauerlien, was only
that of persuasion. 126 Yet, in holding that the statute did not cover
this persuasion and counseling, the court of special appeals ignored
the implicit fact that Runkles's persuasive efforts towards the mother
to relinquish custody was the means by which Runkles achieved his
own end of selling the child for money. 127 Runkles could only make
notion of "child selling," and arguably within the comprehension of § 35C.
120.

121.
122.
123.

See id.
[d. at 502-03, 590 A.2d at 557.
[d. at 498, 590 A.2d at 555.
[d.
[d.

124. State v. Runkles, 326 Md. 382, 401, 605 A.2d Ill, 120 (1992).
125. See Runkles, 87 Md. App. at 502-03, 590 A.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
126. Runkles referred to his own conduct as "influence peddling." [d. at 501, 590
A.2d at 556-57.
127. Petitioner's Brief at 6, 15, Runkles v. State, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992)
(No. 95).
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the offer to sell the custody of Jason if he successfully convinced
Jason's mother to relinquish her rights to the child.128
Perhaps Runkles sold his persuasive abilities for $4,000. After
all, the persuasion was, in fact, the impetus for the subsequent
exchange of the child. Runkles expressly told Jason's grandfather
that he could persuade the mother to sign over the custody of the
child in exchange for the money.129 There is no alternative but to
characterize Runkles's efforts as an offer to sell, barter, or trade a
child.I3O
Not even the best legal manipulation of words or meanings can
change the pivotal fact that "Jason was exchanged or transferred,
for money[;] ... he was 'sold. "'131 This exchange would not have
occurred but for Runkles's involvement. 132 In procuring the exchange,
Runkles made himself a culpable principal, clearly punishable under
the statute. 133
What should have been paramount in the arguments set forth
by both counsel and the judiciary, was Jason's well-being under the
circumstances. Too much emphasis was placed on the interactions
between Jason's mother, Runkles, and Jason's grandfather, as well
as whether the legal definition of custody is synonymous with the
sale, barter, or trade of a child.

v.

CONCLUSION

State v. Runkles is the Court of Appeals of Maryland's first
attempt to outline the scope of section 35C in article 27 of the
Annotated Code of Maryland. In determining that the statute is not
merely limited to proscribing for-profit adoptions, but also includes
any transfer of custody of a child for money, the court broadly, but
correctly, interpreted the intent of the General Assembly in enacting
section 35C. Conduct such as Runkles's necessarily falls within that
broad reach. The court of appeals substantiated its argument based
on the legislative history behind SB 58.
The court of appeals reached its conclusion by interpreting the
ultimate policy, aims, and ends sought to be achieved through the
128.
129.
130.
I31.

[d.
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
See Runkles, 87 Md. App. at 50S, 590 A.2d at 558-59.
Petitioner's Brief at 14, Runkles v. State, 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d III (1992)
(No. 95); see also Memorandum Order at 2, Runkles v. State, 326 Md. 384,
605 A.2d III (1992) (No. 13629) ("The child was ... being traded for
money!").
132. "It was because of [Runkles] that the mother agreed to relinquish her custody
of the child; she had resisted the grandfather's previous attempts to obtain
custody." Runkles v. State, 326 Md. 384, 405, 605 A.2d III, 122 (1992).
133. [d. at 404, 605 A.2d at 121.
.
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enactment of the child selling statute. The result that the court of
appeals reached, and the manner in which it did so, should outweigh
any skepticism placed on its logic through other resolutions proffered
by competing legal experts. Of paramount importance is that the
child was, in fact, exchanged for money. This clearly is what the
General Assembly sought to prevent and prohibit. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland, in Runkles v. State, enforced the legislature's
desire to prohibit "baby selling."
Randi Alyce Klein

